On March 2nd
On March 2nd—approximately 40 hours after the outbreak of war between Iran, the United States, and Israel—Hezbollah decided to join the fighting and open an additional front against Israel. Despite knowing this move would extract a heavy price, the organization acted to advance two primary goals:
- Fulfilling its commitment to Iran: Assisting Tehran by forcing Israel to divert significant military resources to the Lebanese front. This was driven by the organization’s leadership designating the elimination of Ali Khamenei as a “red line,” and fears that an Iranian defeat would lead to a total cessation or drastic reduction of Iranian support.
- Rehabilitating its domestic standing: Attempting to halt negative trends, primarily ongoing Israeli attacks against it. Since the November 2024 ceasefire following “Operation Iron Swords,” Hezbollah had refrained from responding while it focused on reconstruction. Simultaneously, the Lebanese leadership, political elements, and the general public had intensified calls to disarm the group and sever its ties with Iran. This internal criticism grew even among the Shiite community, which felt insufficiently compensated for the damages suffered during the previous conflict.
Unlike the Limited War
Unlike the limited war Hezbollah maintained during “Iron Swords,” the organization viewed “Operation Lion’s Roar” as an existential struggle for itself and its patron, Iran. From the earliest days of the campaign until the ceasefire, Hezbollah utilized its full range of military capabilities. Publicly, its leadership claimed readiness for a prolonged war to halt IDF operations against the group. At the same time, it attempted to obscure its deep coordination with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), whose personnel stayed in Lebanon to assist in both strategic planning and operational management (several of whom, including senior Quds Force officials, were eliminated by the IDF).
The Military Campaign
During roughly six weeks of war, leading up to the temporary ceasefire on April 17th, Hezbollah launched dozens to hundreds of missiles and UAVs daily. These strikes targeted IDF forces in southern Lebanon and northern Israeli communities, but also reached deeper into Israel. Missiles were fired across the Galilee and as far south as Haifa; a few reached central Israel, with one even landing in the Gaza Envelope.
In several instances, Hezbollah and Iran attempted synchronized strikes. Most notably, on March 11th, Hezbollah announced “Operation Eaten Straw” (Al-Asf al-Ma’kul), planning to launch 600 missiles and rockets simultaneously with an Iranian strike on Israel. However, approximately two-thirds of this massive barrage was either preempted or intercepted by the IDF. The organization utilized weaponry remaining from the previous war (estimated by the IDF at 20% of its pre-October 2023 firepower), supplemented by stocks restored and replenished during the 15-month lull.
It is estimated that on the eve of this war, Hezbollah’s arsenal included 20,000–25,000 rockets and missiles—mostly short-range, with a smaller quantity of high-quality medium-range missiles capable of covering all of Israel’s home front—and 1,000–2,000 UAVs. While exact post-war assessments are pending, preliminary analysis suggests Hezbollah launched approximately 8,000 rockets, 300 UAVs, and 140 anti-tank missiles. The IDF Spokesperson reported that roughly 1,800 militants were killed. Furthermore, a significant portion of the organization’s infrastructure was destroyed by extensive IDF airstrikes and a ground maneuver in southern Lebanon that resulted in the seizure of vast quantities of weapons. Hezbollah is now significantly weaker, though it remains a functional threat.
Mixed Strategic Outcomes for Hezbollah
Despite the IDF’s proven military superiority, Hezbollah clings to its “Resistance” ideology, claiming victory. In reality, the results are mixed:
- On one hand: Hezbollah fulfilled its duty to Iran by successfully opening a second front. It demonstrated that despite severe blows, it remains a relevant, resilient, and threatening force that cannot be easily dismantled. The group also claims credit for securing a ceasefire at an “inconvenient” time for Israel, citing Iranian pressure on the Trump administration to force Israel to agree.
- On the other hand: The price was exorbitant. Beyond the loss of personnel, weaponry, and headquarters, Hezbollah failed to prevent the IDF from deepening its presence in southern Lebanon. Following the ceasefire, the IDF remains positioned in a security buffer 8–10 km from the border. Furthermore, Hezbollah failed to force the evacuation of northern Israel, while its actions led to the destruction of Shiite villages in the south of Lebanon, the Beqaa Valley, and Beirut, displacing over a million Lebanese. Politically, the organization is more isolated than ever, facing fierce domestic backlash for dragging Lebanon into a war for foreign interests.
The Internal Lebanese Arena: Unprecedented Shifts
On the eve of “Lion’s Roar,” the Lebanese President and Government demanded Hezbollah stay out of the conflict. Its entry sparked widespread fury. President Aoun, fearing for the future of a country still reeling from the previous war, presented an international framework for a ceasefire. His plan included a total ceasefire, an Israeli withdrawal, the strengthening of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) along the border, and an unprecedented agreement to open direct talks with Israel under international mediation.
The Lebanese government adopted several dramatic, though difficult-to-implement, resolutions:
- Prohibition of Military Activity: Prime Minister Salam announced on March 2nd that the government opposes any military or security activity not conducted by official state institutions. This effectively declared Hezbollah’s military activity illegal. Lebanese media were even instructed to stop using terms like “The Resistance” or “Mujahideen” in reference to the group.
- Reducing Iranian Influence: In a series of bold moves, Lebanon revoked the visa-exempt status for Iranian citizens on March 4th. More significantly, the government demanded that the IRGC leave the country. On March 24th, the Lebanese Foreign Minister declared the Iranian Ambassador persona non grata. The Ambassador has since refused to leave, remaining holed up in the embassy.
- Direct Talks with Israel: This represents a historic pivot in Lebanese policy, which had legally banned any contact with Israel since the 1950s. Leveraging the public outcry against Hezbollah, President Aoun sought to decouple the Lebanese front from the Iranian war. While the initiative enjoys relatively broad public support from Lebanese citizens weary of war, Hezbollah and its supporters have threatened to sabotage these contacts, potentially through violence.
The Israeli Perspective and the Path Forward
For Israel, this round of fighting occurred under sub-optimal conditions as the Lebanese front was designated a “secondary front” to the direct war with Iran. Nevertheless, Israel seized the opportunity to strike Hezbollah after realizing the group was rehabilitating fast and the LAF could not disarm it. The IDF’s ground operations proved that the LAF’s January 2026 claim of controlling the area up to the Litani River was baseless, as Israeli forces encountered extensive Hezbollah infrastructure and weaponry during the current war.
Israel’s stated goal in “Lion’s Roar” was to disarm Hezbollah. The Lebanese proposal for direct talks created a dilemma: some in Israel were hesitant to stop before the group was fully dismantled, while others saw a rare opportunity for a fundamental shift in bilateral relations. Ultimately, following American pressure and the realization that Hezbollah’s capabilities had been significantly degraded, Israel agreed on April 9th to enter direct negotiations.
The first official meeting at the ambassadorial level took place on April 14th in Washington. Israel’s hope to negotiate “under fire” was thwarted by Lebanese and American insistence on a ceasefire.
International Involvement
The United States played a significant role in securing the ceasefire on the Lebanese front following the ceasefire with Iran. In Israel, claims were even heard that President Trump was the one who forced the ceasefire upon Netanyahu, considering Iranian demands on the matter. The Americans also led and facilitated the direct talks between Israel and Lebanon, which contributed to achieving the ceasefire.
In contrast, the involvement of Western countries was extremely limited. France’s involvement was restricted to exerting pressure to halt the fighting, and to its attempt to take part in the talks between the parties—a move that was rejected by both the U.S. and Israel. It appears that following the recent deterioration in France-Israel relations, Paris has lost its capacity to serve as an honest broker in the eyes of Israel. A striking shift in France’s response was evident following the April 18 Hezbollah fire on French UNIFIL troops, which exceptionally drew a harsh condemnation of Hezbollah. In short European involvement today is primarily humanitarian and symbolic. In any case, Western countries could play a vital and significant role should they choose to contribute to the strengthening of the Lebanese state and the LAF (Lebanese Armed Forces) in the aftermath of the war—particularly in light of the anticipated struggle for Lebanon’s leadership against Hezbollah, which threatens the state should it continue on the path of negotiations with Israel.
Conclusion
If negotiations continue, they will be long and complex. While disarming Hezbollah is a shared interest for both Israel and the Lebanese government, the central challenge remains: who will execute it? The Lebanese government is weak and fears a civil war, which Hezbollah has openly threatened. Additionally, Israel’s insistence on maintaining a military presence in southern Lebanon until disarmament is complete remains a major point of contention. Every effort must be made to capitalize on this opportunity to change the security reality on the border. In the absence of a total Israeli occupation of Hezbollah-controlled areas—an undesirable outcome for both sides—the only viable path is a supervised, gradual process. This must combine the disarmament of Hezbollah with the strengthening of the Lebanese state and its military, supported by a massive international civilian and economic reconstruction effort led by the US, the West, and moderate Arab states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE.